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Parochiad and Prayer:
A Perplexing Problem
William R. Fifner*
T HIS PAPER IS LIMITED TO A CHRONOLOGICAL EXAMINATION of decisions
of the United States Supreme Court involving aid to parochial
education, an exploration of possible future aids, and inquiry into
the question whether the extent of present aid and of possible future
aid indicates that parochial schools and the general public are, or
will be, on a collision course with respect to the free exercise of
religion.
Although all types of parochial education are involved in the
problem, the major portion involves Catholic schools, since these
form the overwhelming majority of parochial schools. This article
will, generally, be devoted to the Catholic parochial question, since
it is around this question that the lines are being politically drawn.
There is no question that, with mounting costs for maintaining
schools, the financial burden of the parents of parochial school chil-
dren is great. Nor can it be doubted that the financial burden of all
taxpayers would increase if there were no parochial schools. The
Catholic school system has been estimated to be a $9 billion load
"off the government's back".' United States Senator Taft (R-Ohio)
has estimated that the cost of shifting from private to public schools
would involve $4.7 billion for operations, and up to $10 billion in
construction. 2
The problem is apparent. The solution is obscure.
The Political and Legislative History of "Establishment"
and "Free Exercise"
The words "separation", "Church", and "State", are not found
in the United States Constitution. Yet, these words are the essence
of the problem. What is meant by the First Amendment language:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."?
Any observer of contemporary political expression recognizes
that expressions, often out of context of time or place, are not neces-
sarily conclusive of the views of the author. Yet such expressions
of our Country's founders have been seized upon by those who sup-
port a broad no-aid interpretation and those who support a more
narrow interpretation to support their particular points of view.
*Of Westlake, Ohio; J.D., Case Western Reserve University; Member of the Ohio Bar;
graduate student at Cleveland State University College of Law.
I Deedy, Should Catholic Schools Survive? THE NEw REPUBLIC, Mar. 13, 1971 at 16
[hereinafter cited as Deedy].
2 The Cleveland Press, Apr. 25, 1972.
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Narrow constructionists rely upon the fact that the Amendments
Committee of the Virginia ratifying convention of 1788 proposed
only that an amendment should be added that "no particular reli-
gious sect or society ought to be favored or established by law, in
preference to others." 3 Many, including the Court, use the writings
of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison to "prove" a broad inter-
pretation. Some belittle the correspondence of Thomas Jefferson by
pointing out that recommendations made by him while Rector of
the University of Virginia do not support the correspondence, and
this is disputed by an argument about the grammatical meaning of
the recommendation. 4 James Madison's essays are disputed by some
who maintain that the only creditable evidence of his view is his
statement in Congress on June 8, 1789 that he considered it proper
to submit an amendment that no national religion shall be estab-
lished.5 Statements made, for and against at state ratifying conven-
tions, and the actions taken, have been used by both sides to support
their position.6
Many other historical conflicts were present and have been
cited by both sides of the argument. Certainly this is due in large
measure to the fact that the sixth, and final, draft of the Amendment
is "at best opaque",7 and the two religion clauses are "not the most
precisely drawn of the Constitution".8
These historical conflicts, and the extreme interpretations given
by both sides, indicate, as Professor Gianella suggests, that any
thoroughgoing effort to interpret the First Amendment by resort
to the original understanding of either the authors or ratifiers of the
Constitution is apt to be a misguided, if not dangerous, effort.9
Whatever the views of historians or religious and legal scholars
the two clauses, (or parallel participial phrases),1O have such mean-
ing as the Supreme Court from time to time places upon them, and
it is to the Court that we turn. Broad interpretations and more
narrow interpretations have been expressed in the cases by majority
or dissent. Both sides in future aid cases will use these expressions
and the justices who made them. Thus both positions and their
advocates must be explored.
3 C. ANTIEU, A. DowNEY & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT, 119
(1964).
4 L. PFEFFER, CHURCH STATE .AND FREEDOM, 119 (1963).
5 Id. at 123.
6 Id. at 194.
7 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
8 Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
9 Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part 1.
The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1391, 1383 (1967).
10 D. OAKS, THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE, 3 [hereinafter cited as OAKS].
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Establishment and the Court
The first case dealing with state aid arose before the establish-
ment clause was made applicable to the States and involved a Four-
teenth Amendment attack against a Louisiana statute authorizing the
use of tax funds to furnish textbooks to private, as well as public,
school children.1 1 Mr. Justice Hughes delivered the opinion for a
unanimous Court. He pointed out that the books were furnished to the
children, and only they, and the state, benefitted, and concluded that
there is no violation of the fourteenth amendment where private
school children are furnished "the same books that are furnished chil-
dren attending public schools". 12
Everson v. Board of Education13 involved a New Jersey statute
which authorized reimbursement to parents of the cost of providing
public bus transportation for their children to and from school. Some
of the reimbursement was to Catholic parents. The opinion of the
5-to-4 majority, which sustained the constitutionality, was delivered
by Mr. Justice Black, who furnished the Court's first interpretation
of the meaning of the establishment clause:
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Fed-
eral Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another .. .No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, par-
ticipate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups
and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect' a wall
of separation between Church and State.'14
Although the Court was sharply divided, there was no dispute
among the nine Justices concerning the accuracy of the definition.
The only dispute centered on the application of the definition to the
constitutionality of the aid at issue. The cases which followed also
accepted the definition, and, although it was originally thought to
be obiter dicta, it can no longer be so construed. 15
The due process argument that the state taxed some to help
others carry out their private purpose was raised in Everson but was
dismissed, citing Cochran, because, "It is much too late to argue that
legislation intended to facilitate the opportunity of children to get
a secular education serves no public purpose".' 6 New Jersey had
11 Cochran v. Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
12 Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
'3 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
14 Id. at 15, 16.
15 Rev. Fey, Problems of Church and State in the United States: Ai Protestant View,
32 [hereinafter cited as Fey], in OAKS, supra note 10.
16 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 7 (1947).
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decided that this was a public purpose, and the Court accepted
this conclusion.
To Mr. Justice Black the establishment clause means that a state
cannot contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution
which teaches the tenets and faith of any church. However, it cannot
exclude (faiths or non-faiths) from receiving the benefits of public
welfare legislation because to do so would hamper the free exercise
of religion of its citizens. He discussed the dangers incident to walk-
ing, the safety of the children on a bus, the fact that some parents
would be reluctant to send their children to school if they had to
walk, and found constitutionality because:
The State contributes no money to the schools. It does
not support them. Its legislation, as applied, does no more
than provide a general program to help parents get their
children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously
to and from accredited schools. 17
The Everson majority opinion concludes with the statement:
The First Amendment has erected a wall between church
and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable.
We could not approve the slightest breach. New Jersey has not
breached it here.18
The Everson dissent was troubled. Mr. Justice Jackson, joined
joined by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, did not reject the interpretation
of the clause, but rejected the safety argument on the basis that
children were no more safe on the bus whether paid by the state
or parents; rejected the comparison with other benefits afforded
such as police and fire protection, on the basis that these services
are performed for persons or property as a part of society, and critic-
ally said:
[T]he undertones of the opinion, advocating complete
and uncompromising separation of Church from State, seem
utterly discordant with its conclusion yielding support to
their commingling in educational matters. 19
Mr. Justice Rutledge, in dissent, joined by Mr. Justices Frank-
furter, Jackson, and Burton also rejected the safety argument as
one bearing no resemblance to a safety measure and found no com-
parison with police or fire protection. To him, the establishment
clause, and the wall of separation, prohibit any type of state support,
financial or otherwise, of religion in any guise, form, or degree. In
his opinion,
Legislatures are free to make, and courts to sustain, ap-
propriations only when it can be found in fact they do not
aid, promote, encourage or sustain religious teachings or
observances, be the amount large or small. No such finding
has or could be made in this case.2 0
17 Id. at 18.
18 Id. at 18.
19 Id. at 19.
20 Id. at 52-53.
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He prophetically, and almost mournfully, noted that the wall was
neither so high nor so impregnable following the majority's decision
as it was before, and that this was the first breach, if not the second
(viz., Cochran). He warned, "That a third, and a fourth, and still
others will be attempted, we may be sure", and sadly observed: "For
just as Cochran . . . has opened the way by oblique ruling for this
decision, so will the two make wider the breach for a third. Thus
with time the most solid freedom steadily gives way before con-
tinuing corrosive action". 21
According to Pfeffer, the Catholics hailed Everson as a victory
for religious liberty, and the Protestants criticized it as impairing
separation. 22 Whatever else may have been said, it is apparent that
Everson broadly interpreted the establishment clause to prohibit any
aid to religion but not as a prohibition against welfare legislation
that can be considered as having a "child benefit", even though the
aid may indirectly aid religion by releasing funds which can be used
for religious purposes. From Everson have come hot lunches, text-
books, instructional materials, etc., in addition to bus transportation.
Mr. Justice Rutledge did not have long to wait for the third
breach to be attempted. In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion, 28 public school parents were permitted to sign request cards,
and their children were then permitted to attend religious instruction
classes conducted during school hours in the public school building
by outside teachers furnished by a religious council representing
certain faiths, subject to the approval of the superintendent of
schools. Attendance records at these classes were kept and reported,
and non-attenders were required to continue their secular studies.
With Mr. Justice Reed as the lone dissenter, Mr. Justice Black de-
livered the opinion of the Court, striking down this practice as a
violation of the establishment clause. He rejected the argument that
the Court's (i.e., his) views as set forth in Everson were dicta as to
the meaning of the Establishment Clause and the argument that the
First Amendment was historically intended to forbid only govern-
ment preference of one religion over another, not an impartial gov-
ernmental assistance of all religions.2 4 As far as he was concerned:
Pupils compelled by law to go to school for secular edu-
cation are released in part from their legal duty upon the
condition that they attend the religious classes. This is be-
yond all question, a use of the tax-established and tax-sup-
ported public school system to aid religious groups to spread
the faith.2 5
Although we might wonder "when is aid, aid?", and "when is
aid, not aid?", we can conclude from Everson and McCollum that where
21 Id. at 29.
'2 Supra note 4 at 138.
23 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
24 Id. at 211.
25 Id. at 209-10.
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the aid is indirect as in Everson, and does no more than provide a
public welfare "pupil benefit", it is constitutional. Such aid is inci-
dental to the compulsory school laws. However, where, as in McCollum,
the aid is direct and related to the compulsory school law, it is uncon-
stitutional. The non-preference theory (i.e., aid to religion is not
prohibited so long as given to all religions) was advanced in the
McCollum briefs but not accepted by the Court. Pfeffer notes that,
in any event, the Court could scarcely have accepted the theory in
McColun since only the sects which worked through Interfaith Coun-
cil were included (which excluded Lutherans and Jehovah's Wit-
nesses), Catholics were taught in a basement room, and it would
have been a fiction to say that the attendance was purely "volun-
tary".28
Just four years later in Zorach v. Clauson, in an opinion written,
perhaps surprisingly, by Mr. Justice Douglas, a different form of
"released time" was sustained.27 The facts, so far as relevant, dif-
fered from McCollum only in that the children whose parents made
application were released during school hours to leave the school
premises and attend their respective religious centers. Mr. Justice
Rutledge's wall is under the fourth attack, and this one is successful.
The broad, strict separation interpretation of the amendment, as
expressed in Everson is surely tempered by a statement that:
The First Amendment, however, does not say that in
every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church
and State. Rather it studiously defines the manner, the
specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or
dependency one on the other. That is the common sense of
the matter.28
Although, as he later regretted, Mr. Justice Douglas was with the
Everson majority, this could not be called a "pupil benefit" case in
the Everson sense. He had joined the McCollum majority, indeed af-
firmed that he was following McCollum, but finds a distinction, and
no breach of the establishment clause, where public funds are not
being used per se, nor are public school classrooms. He stated that:
We are a religious people whose institutions presup-
pose a Supreme Being . . . When the State encourages reli-
gious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by
adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs,
it follows the best of our traditions ... Government may not
finance religious groups nor undertake religious education
nor use secular institutions to force one or some religion on
any person. But we find no constitutional requirement which
makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion
and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective
scope of religious influence.2 9
26 Supra note 4 at 347.
27 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
2 Id. at 312.
29 Id. at 313-14.
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Having reached the above position as respects the State vis-a-vis
the Church, he concludes that although following McCollum, it cannot
be expanded to cover the instant released time program since the
first amendment does not require such hostility to religion that it
would forbid public institutions from making adjustments of their
schedules to meet the religious needs of the people.3 0
Mr. Justice Black, in almost angry dissent, found no difference
between the McCollum and Zorach systems "even worthy of men-
tion".3' He was not impressed by the fact that the school buildings
were not being used, because:
As we attempted to make categorically clear, the Mc-
Collum decision would have been the same if the religious
classes had not been held in the school building.32
Very possibly the real difference between McCollum and Zorach
is that Justices Murphy and Rutledge died in between them and
were replaced by Justices Clark and Minton. Surely Mr. Justice
Rutledge, and possibly Mr. Justice Murphy, would have voted with
Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson in Zorach.
Mr. Justice Black was troubled by the fact that, to him, the
State of New York was manipulating, coercively, its compulsory
education system to help religious sects get pupils, resulting in a
combination, rather than a separation, of Church and State.33 Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, believed that the "pith" of the case
was that those who do not attend the religion classes were compelled
to attend their regular school classes. 34 Mr. Justice Jackson, in dissent,
thought that the distinction between McCollum and Zorach was "tri-
vial, almost to the point of cynicism":
A reading of the Court's opinion in this case will show
such difference of overtones and undertones as to make clear
that the McCollum case has passed like a storm in a teacup.
The wall which the Court was professing to erect between
Church and State has become even more warped and twisted
than I expected.3 5
By 1952, then, a theory has evolved that it is not unconstitutional
for the state to "accommodate" religion. The Zorach majority pointed
out certain areas of accommodation-prayers in the legislative halls,
executive proclamations, courtroom oaths, public rituals-and the
McCollum form of released time appears to be another acceptable ac-
commodation.
Pfeffer noted that the Zorach Court did not repeat the McCollum
interpretation of the amendment, specifically omitted the statement
30 Id. at 315.
31 Id. at 316.
32 Id. at 316.
33 Id. at 318.
84 Id. at 321.
35 Id. at 325.
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about government neutrality as between religion and non-religion,
and:
1. Adopted the argument, rejected in McCollurn (but still
as valid) that the permissibility of government aid to-or at
least cooperation with-religion could be inferred from the
fact that "we are a religious people".
2. Adopted the argument that practices determine, or at
least evidence, constitutionality. These religious practices
such as courtroom oaths, etc., were present, and rejected, in
McCollurn and the only things that had changed were the tem-
per of the times and the personnel of the Court.
3. Adopted the argument (heretofore raised only by one
Justice-Reed-in McCollurn dissent) that the First Amend-
ment does not require that in every and all respects there
shall be separation of Church and State.
3 6
Professor Kurland believes it is clear that the 'purpose and pri-
mary effect' of the released time legislation approved in Zorach is
"the advancement of religion".37 However, the case has never been
overruled.
The "primary purpose and effect" mentioned by Kurland becomes
important in two cases involving Sunday closing laws rather than
school aid. The validity of such a statute was sustained in McGowan
v. Maryland. 8 The Court admits the purely religious origin of such
laws but believes that in the course of history both federal and state
governments have oriented their activities very largely toward the
improvement of the health, safety, recreation, and general well-
being of our citizens, and that such laws had evolved into a distinct
secular purpose-a "day of rest"-having no present relationship to
establishment of religion. The Court stated:
The "Establishment Clause" does not ban federal or state
regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely happen to
coincide or harmonize with the intents of some or all reli-
gions. In many instances, the Congress or state legislatures
conclude that the general welfare of society, wholly apart from
any religious considerations, demands such regulations. 39
and it concluded:
The present purpose or effect of most [Sunday Closing
Laws] is to provide a uniform day of rest for all citizens;
... To say that the States cannot prescribe Sunday as a day
of rest for these purposes solely because centuries ago such
laws had their genesis in religion would give a constitutional
interpretation of hostility to the public welfare rather than
one of mere seperation of church and state.40
36 Supra note 4- at 157-159.
37 Kurland, The School Prayer Cases, 142, 161 [hereinafter cited as Kurland] in
OAKS, supra, note 10.
38 366 U.S. 420, 421 (1961).
39 Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
40 Id. at 445 (emphasis added).
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On the same day, in Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market,4
the Court sustained the Massachusetts Sunday closing statute, stating
that "we do not find that the present statute's purpose or effect is
religious". 42
Mr. Justice Douglas, who had believed that we were "a religious
people", and at least inferentially rejected the non-preference theory
in Zorach nine years earlier, was the lone "establishment" dissenter
in these Sunday closing cases.
It would appear that from a "strict separation" start, and the
addition of "pupil benefit" and "government accommodation" we can
add a "primary purpose and effect" theory of permissibility.
A simple prayer prescribed by a Board of Education in New
York was at issue in Engel v. Vitale.43 The prayer was:
Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon
Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our
teachers and our Country.44
There were no compulsions on the students, who could stand or not
stand, recite or not recite, or even leave the classroom while the
teacher read the prayer. Mr. Justice Black, again entering the fray,
delivered the opinion for five members of the Court. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter and White took no part in the decision. Mr. Justice
Douglas concurred, and Mr. Justice Stewart dissented. The Court
struck down the prayer as violating the establishment clause, stating:
[T]he constitutional prohibition against laws respecting
an establishment of religion must at least mean that in this
country it is no part of the business of government to com-
pose official prayers for any group of the American people
to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by gov-
ernment.
45
It has been wryly pointed out: "Certainly there is something
anomalous about a wall that will admit a school bus without 'the
slightest breach' but is impervious to a prayer".4 6 To that might
be added, that there is also something anomalous about a wall which
will admit released time away from school, and will admit, as Mr.
Justice Black so carefully pointed out by footnote as ceremonial and
therefore distinguishable, schoolroom recitation of the Declaration
of Independence with its reference to the Diety, singing officially
espoused anthems which include the composer's professions of faith
in a Supreme Being, etc. 47 Mr. Justice Douglas was by now not so
sure about these so-called ceremonial functions and also took the
occasion of this case to state:
41 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
2 Id. at 630.
43 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
44 Id. at 422.
45 Id. at 425.
46 OAKS, supra note 10, at 2-3.
47 Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962).
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The Everson case seems in retrospect to be out of line
with the First Amendment. Its result is appealing, as it allows
aid to be given to needy children. Yet, by the same token,
public funds could be used to satisfy other needs of children
in parochial schools-lunches, books, and tuition being ob-
vious examples.48
Kurland believes that the only thing left clear by Engel was that
if the decisions of the past failed to produce a governing principle,
no remedy of that defect is found in Engel, and the reader gets the
impression of "the Justices of the majority walking on eggs, and of
the . . . minority . . . stamping after them".
49
Two companion cases, School District of Abington Township, Pa.
v. Schempp and Murray v. Curlett,50 involved school district require-
ments that classes be commenced each day with readings from the
Bible and recitation by the students of the Lord's Prayer. Once
again the wall was impervious to prayer. Mr. Justice Clark delivered
the opinion for the Court. He observed that in eight cases over a
score of years, and with only one Justice dissenting on the particular
point, the Court:
[H]as consistently held that the clause withdrew all
legislative power respecting religious belief or the expression
thereof. The test may be stated as follows: what are the pur-
poses and primary effect of the enactment? If either is the ad-
vancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment ex-
ceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the
Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of
the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion.51
The Court distinguishes the free exercise and establishment clauses
on the basis that a violation of the former is predicated on coercion,
while there need be none for the latter. Applying the principles to
the two cases, the Court concludes that the religious "exercises" are
unconstitutional, adding:
Further, it is no defense to urge that the religious prac-
tices here may be relatively minor encroachments on the
First Amendment. The breach of neutrality that is today a
trickling stream may all too soon become a raging torrent
52
Mr. Justice Rutledge would surely agree.
As far as Kurland was concerned, the single certain conclusion
to be drawn from Engel and Schempp is that the states may not pre-
scribe the conduct of religious ceremonies in their public schools.5 3
49 Id. at 443.
49 Kurland, supra note 37, at 153.
50 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
51 Id. at 222 (empkasi, added).
52 Id. at 225.
53 Kurland, supra note 37, at 178.
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Once Engel had been decided, "only a surrender to the political power
of the churches similar to that made in Zorach could have caused
the Court to decide the Schempp case otherwise".
54
"Government neutrality" becomes a theory in Schempp, as a
requirement of the establishment and free exercise clauses, and the
test of neutrality is the "primary purposes and effect" test delineated.
Kurland views the establishment clause as an absolute "neutrality"
requirement. Government can do nothing, or refrain from doing
something, that will confer a benefit, or impose a burden, upon reli-
gion. It cannot do anything which either aids or hampers religion.
55
However, it would not appear that the test of Schempp is as far-
reaching toward "neutrality" as Kurland would fashion.
Unlike Cochran, which was challenged on familiar due process
grounds, Board of Education v. Allen, 6 involved a First Amendment
challenge to a New York statute requiring local public school author-
ities to lend textbooks free of charge to all students in grades 7
through 12, including private school children. Mr. Justice White, for
the majority, noted that the books designated by the state or approved
by the board of education were ones which a pupil was required to use
for at least one semester in a class in the school he legally attends.
The Court recognized that the line between state neutrality and
state support was not easy to locate and likened this case to Everson.
It found nothing in the law that was contrary to its stated purpose
(educational aid is required by the public welfare and national de-
fense) and found no abridgment of the first amendment--after assum-
ing that only secular testbooks would be provided, and these would
not be unsuitable for use in the public schools because of any religious
content. 57
Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, made an extremely interesting
restatement of the test:
I would hold that where the contested governmental
activity is calculated to achieve non-religious purposes other-
wise within the competence of the State, and where the activ-
ity does not involve the State so significantly and directly in
the realm of the sectarian as to give rise to . . . divisive in-
fluences and inhibitions of religion . . . it is not forbidden
by the religious clauses of the First Amendment.5"
Mr. Justice Black was in dissent in Allen, and worse, found the
majority using and, to him, misreading, his Everson opinion to sus-
tain its postion. He believed Allen to be a:
[F]lat, flagrant, open violation of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments which together forbid Congress or state
54 Id. at 172.
55 Id. at 160.
56 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
57 Id. at 245.
58 Id. at 249.
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legislatures to enact any law "respecting an establishment
of religion".59
As far as Mr. Justice Black was concerned, both Everson and
McCollum plainly interpret the Constitution as protecting public tax-
payers from being compelled to pay taxes to their government to
support the agencies of private religious organizations the taxpayers
oppose. He envisions sectarian religious propagandists continuing the
struggle for complete domination and supremacy and worries that
"it nearly always is by insidious approaches that the citadels of
liberty are most successfully attacked". 60 This is the same Justice
who was not concerned in Everson that there may be some aid to
parochial schools by the bus transportation?
Mr. Justice Douglas, having previously questioned the correct-
ness of Everson, is also in Allen dissent. To him, seemingly totally
secular subjects can be treated, by text-book, with extremely reli-
gious overtones. He envisions a sectarian-secular battle for control
of the school board, with the political lines drawn, and is convinced:
Now that "secular" textbooks will pour into religious
schools, we can rest assured that a contest will be on to pro-
vide those books for religious schools which the dominant
religious group concludes best reflects the theocentric or
other philosophy of the particular church. 61
Mr. Justice Fortas, also in Allen dissent, distinguishes from
Everson, where the same service or facility was extended to children
attending parochial schools as to public school children. 62
The Allen decision was critically examined by Professor Freund.
The opinion was guarded, in that, because of the lack of evidence
as to the exact nature of the books, there were favorable assumptions
accorded to the defense. It was narrow also, with its stress upon the
fact that the books were only loaned, and the requests were made by
and on behalf of the students, not the school. The majority's analogy
to Everson is questionable. Bus rides are not ideological, but can the
same be said of textbooks chosen by a parochial school for compulsory
use, interpreted by teachers selected by that school, and employed
in a deliberately religious atmosphere? Anticipating the next ad-
vancement from Allen-i.e., to textbooks not on loan, or not in form
requested by pupils, books of a character or for use in schools dif-
ferent from the circumstantial presumptions of Allen, unconditional
grants for specified areas of learning, and lump sum grants-Freund
believes that there are three constitutional choices: (1) aid man-
datory; (2) aid permissible; (3) aid impermissible. The first is not
acceptable, the second would ordinarily be best (were the issue not
religious) as it would permit the state's political process to function
59 Id. at 250.
60 Id. at 252.
61 id. at 265.
62 Id. at 271.
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in constitutional grey areas, but, he would choose the latter and have
no further expansion of Allen beyond its narrow grounds because
political divisions along religious lines is one of the principal evils
that the first amendment sought to forestall.63
Both establishment and free exercise were considered involved
in Epperson v. Arkansas,64 although financial school aid was not in
issue. An Arkansas statute made it a misdemeanor for a teacher in
any state-supported school to teach the theory or doctrine of evolu-
tion, or use any textbooks which supported this theory. Mr. Justice
Fortas delivered the opinion for the Court, holding, with no dissent,
that the statute was violative of both clauses of the first amendment,
and stating:
Government in our democracy, state and national, must
be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and prac-
tice. The First Amendment mandates governmental neu-
trality between religion and religion, and between religion
and non-religion. 65
There is, and can be no doubt that the First Amendment
does not permit the State to require that teaching and learn-
ing must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any
religious sect or dogma. 66
The State may not adopt programs or practices in its
public schools which "aid or oppose" any religion. This pro-
hibition is absolute. It forbids alike the preference of a religious
doctrine or the prohibition of theory which is deemed ag-
nostic to a particular dogma. 67
The neutrality concept of Epperson appears more akin than
Schempp to Kurland's view. The inter-relationship that the Court
extends to the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses was again
demonstrated in Walz v. Tax Comnission." After an early colonial
history of tax exemption for religious institutions extending before,
during, and after the Constitutional debates, and continuing to the
present day, the Court met, for the first time, a challenge to the
constitutionality of property tax exemptions to religious organ-
izations for religious properties used solely for religious purposes.
Mr. Justice Burger, for the Court, comes to the view that there is
no constitutional absolute straight line, no constant rigidity, and
reaches a general first amendment principle that:
[W]e will not tolerate either governmentally established
religion or governmental interference with religion. Short
of those expressly proscribed governmental acts there is
room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neu-
68 Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARM. L. REV. 1680-1692 (1969).
61 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
65 Id. at 103-04.
66 Id. at 106.
67 Id. at 106-07.
68 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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trality which will permit religious exercise to exist without
sponsorship and without interference.
6 9
He noted the apparent concessions of Everson, Zorach, and Allen, and
stated:
With all the risks inherent in programs that bring about
administrative relationships between public education bodies
and church-sponsored schools, we have been able to chart a
course that preserved the autonomy and freedom of religious
bodies while avoiding any semblance of established religion.
This is a "tight rope" and one we have successfully tra-
versed.70
The Court discounts, and rejects, the social welfare theory. It does
not read the tax exemption statute as an attempt to establish a
religion but reads it as simply sparing the free exercise of religion
from the burden of property taxation levied on private profit insti-
tutions. The Court does wonder if such legislation might entail an
"excessive" governmental "entanglement" with religion. It concludes,
perhaps rationalizes, that, "The grant of tax exemption is not spon-
sorship since the government does not transfer part of its revenue
to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the church
support the state". 1 Anyway, "The exemption creates only a min-
imal and remote involvement between church and state and far less
than taxation of churches".72 To "neutrality" can be added "bene-
volent neutrality" as constitutionality permissible. It would appear
that in a period of just two years, the Court has gone from an opinion
of neutrality closely akin to Kurland's, to one poles apart.
Mr. Justice Douglas was in solitary dissent in Walz. Admitting to
being one of the 5-to-4 majority in Everson, he questions its correct-
ness, stating that he "has since had grave doubts about it, because I
have become convinced that grants to institutions teaching a sec-
tarian creed violate the Establishment Clause".72
Tilton v. Richardson74 and the companion cases of Lemon v. Kurts-
man and Earley v. DiCenso75 were decided on the same day. The Tilton
Court sustained that part of the Federal Higher Education Facilities
Act of 196376 which provided for federal construction grants for col-
leges and universities, including parochial, but excluding any facility
to be used for sectarian purposes. The Lemon Court struck down a
Pennsylvania statute that aided non-public elementary schools by
way of direct reimbursement for teachers' salaries, and textbooks
and instructional materials in specified secular subjects (mathematics,
modern foreign languages, physical science, and physical education).
69 Id. at 669.
70 Id. at 672.
71 Id. at 675.
72 Id. at 676.
13 Id. at 703.
14 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
75 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
78 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-58.
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All materials were to be approved by the state, with no reimburse-
ment for any course expressing religious teaching or the morals of
any sect. A Rhode Island statute was also struck down. It paid directly
to non-public elementary teachers a supplement of 15% of their
annual salary if they taught only courses offered in the public
schools, used only teaching materials offered in the public schools,
and taught no religion courses while receiving the supplement.
Since this article is primarily concerned with state aid to parochial
education below the college level, the Tilton decision is not particu-
larly germane, because the Tilton Court specifically distinguished
that case from Lemon on the basis of three factors which substan-
tially diminish the extent and potential danger of aid in Tilton. The
three factors are that: (1) there are significant differences between
the church-related institutions of higher learning and schools below
that level-the affirmative, if not dominant, policy of the latter being
to assure future adherents by educational control at an early age, and
the latter, even though admittedly religious schools, have a primary
purpose of providing their students with secular education; (2) the
aid given is non-ideological-i.e., the construction of buildings for
secular purposes, and the cases have upheld the right of churches
to receive government aid in the form of secular, neutral, or non-
ideological services, facilities, or materials that are supplied to all
students regardless of the affiliation of the school which they attend,
and; (3) these grants, unlike ones involving direct and continuing
payments with all the incidents of regulation and surveillance, are
one-time, single-purpose, construction grants."
Tilton is of importance, however. For one reason, Mr. Chief Justice
Burger, who announced the decision and wrote the opinion, was
able to get just three Justices to join the opinion in spite of the higher
education aspect-Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Blackmun. Mr. Jus-
tice White concurred in the result. Mr. Justice Brennan dissented as
to the constitutionality of the Act as it applied to federal aid to
sectarian institutions. Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice
Black and Marshall, also dissented and said:
I dissent not because of any lack of respect for parochial
schools but out of a feeling of despair that the respect which
through history has been accorded the First Amendment is
this day lost.78
It is important, also, because of four questions fashioned by the Court
in order to reach an understanding of the constitutionality:
1. Does the Act reflect a secular legislative purpose?
2. Is the primary purpose of the Act to advance or inhibit
religion?
3. Does the administration of the Act (i.e., the effect foster
an extensive government entanglement with religion?
7 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-86 (1971).
79 Id. at 696-97.
Sept. 1972
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1972
PAROCHIAD AND PRAYER
4. Does the implementation of the Act inhibit the Free Ex-
ercise of religion?79
The Court was able to answer "Yes" to the first question, and "No"
to the next three.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger also delivered the opinion in Lemon.
The first three questions above-the Establishment questions--were
restated. The Court was particularly unable to answer "No" to
the third question. It took note of the full language of the establish-
ment clause, observing:
A given law might not establish a religion but nevertheless
be one "respecting" that end in the sense of being a step that
could lead to such establishment and hence offend the First
Amendment.8 0
The Chief Justice's dictum did not consider that the prior holdings
of the Court called for total separation between church and state,
believing that this was not possible in an absolute sense.
Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize that
the line of separation, far from being a "wall", is a blurred,
indistinct and variable barrier depending on all the circum-
stances of a particular relationship.8 '
Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Black, concurred but he
was obliged to point out the dangers of subsidy, in any form, Mr.
Justice White dissented, being unable to "understand how the Court
can accept the considered judgment of Congress that its program is
constitutional and yet reject the equally considered decisions of the
Rhode Island and Pennsylvania legislatures that their programs
represent a constitutionally acceptable accommodation between
church and state.8 2
Such is the status of the Supreme Court today. We have seen
a "wall of separation between church and state" articulated as one
that will not "admit the slightest breach". Yet it has admitted bus
transportation reimbursement to parents, released time away from
public school premises during school hours, loaned textbooks, con-
struction grants to colleges, and real estate tax exemption for
churches. It has refused to admit shared time in public school build-
ings during school hours, state prescribed prayers in public schools,
reimbursement of salaries of secular teachers and salary supplements.
We have seen cases "followed" which seemed incapable to "lead".
We have seen no case overruled.
The sharply divided Court in many of the decisions, the some-
times seemingly inconsistent conclusions, the changes that seem to
have, or actually did, take place in the minds of some of the Justices
as to what constituted a breach of the interpretation, and, what
70 Id. at 677.
80 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
81 Id. at 614.
82 id. at 671.
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seems to be an amendment to the interpretation, without calling it
thus-all combine to leave one, approaching the next part of the
inquiry, believing that he is much like Alice and the King at her
trial:
"What do you know about this business?", the King said
to Alice.
"Nothing", said Alice.
"Nothing 'whatever'"? persisted the King.
"Nothing 'whatever' ", said Alice.
"That's very important", the King said, turning to the
jury".83
The Arguments For and Against Additional Aid
Whatever hope there may have been for an accommodation be-
tween the public and parochial school systems has been weakened,
if not destroyed, by the secularization of the public schools, coupled
with the compulsory education laws. To the Catholics, or at least to
many of them, the philosophy of secular education is not merely
neutrality with regard to religion and creed but is a positive, religious
philosophy which contradicts Catholic principles of education. This
being the case, the state, having adopted compulsory education laws,
is under an affirmative duty to provide schools that accord with the
dictates of the parents' conscience. 84
This basically moral concept is not easily refuted, nor should it
be casually dismissed. Powerful religio-philosophical arguments can
be advanced that secular education is indeed a religious education. In
United States v. Seeger,8 5 a unanimous Court construed the test of the
words "in relation to a Supreme Being," as used for conscientious
objector exemption under The Military Training and Service Act,8 6
to be "whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies
a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that fulfilled by the
orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemp-
tion".8 7 Obviously, such a view of man's ethical values, and an even
more removed approach in the public school system, is unacceptable
to those who believe that "education is not complete unless the pupil
is presented with the whole of life, which includes an awareness of
his obligation to God".88
But morality alone will not solve the Catholics' dilemma, nor are
they without constitutional arguments. If Catholic parents are re-
quired to send their children to school and have a constitutionally
8a L. CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND, (1875), (The Heritage Press ed.)
161 (1941).
84 Note, Catholic Schools and Public Money, 50 YALE L. J. 917, 923 (1941).
85 380 U.S. 163 (1964).
86 50 U.S.C.A. 456 (j).
87 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1964).
88 W. PARSON, S.J., THE FIRsT FREEDOM, 5-6 (1948).
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guaranteed right to direct the education of their children in accord-
ance with religious conviction, is it not an infringement of their reli-
gious liberty to tax them for the financial support of a public school
system which is being conducted in a manner which conflicts with
their religious convictions? If this guaranteed liberty can be exer-
cised only at the price of a penalty, does not this penalty on "the
exercise of a freedom . . . limit it in fact, if not in theory?" 89
Professor Drinan fortifies the moral arguments of the Catholic
by the conclusion that the neutrality principle established by the
Court is constitutionally wrong because "the silent assumption by
the public schools that religion in any meaningful sense is irrelevant
to the educational process amounts to an official establishment of
secular values". 90 He believes that the Sunday Closing cases make
it clear that the separation requirement does not mean the state, in
carrying out a legitimate secular purpose, must do so in a way that
gives no aid to religion. The line of cases from Everson to Engel make
it equally clear that public money cannot logically be withheld from
the private school if it is publicly accredited as an institution where
children may fulfill their legal duty to attend school.91 To him, a
correct Constitutional interpretation of the meaning of the establish-
ment clause as expressed in Everson, proscribes funds to teach or
practice religion, but does not proscribe funds for secular education
even though under religious auspices. Nor is there any prohibition
to funds to a church related institution for accomplishing a secular
purpose merely because such a grant might liberate other funds of
the institution for use in pursuit of a religious purpose.92 In fact, it is
constitutionally wrong for a state to finance instruction permeated
with a secularistic outlook, if it cannot provide funds for instruction
in secular subjects where religious values are commingled in the
instruction". 9
Some of those who oppose the use of public funds for the aid of
parochial schools, or parochial parents, are the same persons who
opposed prayers, Bible reading, or other religious practices in the
public schools. However, such persons are in the extreme minority.
The great majority of the opponents are those parents who are at
least morally opposed to the "exercises" decisions stemming from
Engel.
To many citizens, the free, public school system is one of great
attributes, and bulwarks, of our society. Aid to private schools
threatens this system because it will lead additional religious and
89 SrSER M. RAYMOND McLAUGHLIN, RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND THE STATE-DEMoc-
RACY FINDS A WAY, at 18 (1967).
90 Drinan, The Constitutionality of Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 69, 70 in OAKS,
supra note 10.
I' Id. at 60.
92 Id. at 66.
I. Id. at 64.
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other groups to undertake educational instruction programs in reli-
ance on tax support. These inroads and "further fragmentation would
destroy or at least weaken public schools so gravely that they could
not meet the educational needs of all the children of our society".
94
To these opponents, all parents are free to send their children to
public schools, and if, for any reason, they elect a private school, they
must bear the expense of this choice. 95
Running through the views of many of the opponents is the sin-
cere, non-bigoted, belief that parochial aid can only lead to divisive-
ness, and seriously threaten the country's intersectarian compromise.
It has been expressed that Catholic aid "entails a willingness, if not
a necessity, to support with public funds the separate schools of any
legitimate religious, social, or even political group and this is not
an inviting prospect to a society already harassed by growing reli-
gious segregation and social and ideological stratification". 96 In the
same tenor, another writer believes that any merger of the voluntary
element of religion and the compulsory element of government "will
compromise individual freedom and disrupt public order" and "will
make the state the determiner of what is and what is not religious".9 7
Another believes that "substitution of endless diversity of sectarian
private schools for the common public school as a principal means of
elementary and secondary education will promote not pluralism but
a dangerous diviseness" and "politics and religion will become in-
separably intertwined".98
Such are the pros and cons. It is obvious that there are heavy
undertones of morality intermingled with all Constitutional argu-
ments, but "fairness" and "justice" arguments will not decide the
problem. "It may be neither to tax parochial parents and have them
pay for public schools, but it is also neither to tax the public to
support schools which it does not want".91
Two Polar Positions
Two positions, poles apart, have been expressed about the wis-
dom of increased aid, one being from an unexpected source.
One view, expressed by Deedy, the managing editor of The
Commonweal is that the Catholic Church may win the battle over aid,
and lose the war. To his thinking, it is the parish, not the school,
which must be the center of the faith, but the trend has been to
direct all energy away from the parish and toward the school, which
has caused dissension between those Catholics who support emphasis
94 Gordon, The Unconstitutionality of Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 73, 74-75 in
OAKS supra note 10.
95 C. MOEHLMAN, THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE, 168 (1948).
96 Supra note 84 at 926.
97 Fey, supra note 15 at 38.
9S Supra note 94 at 77-78.
99 OAKS, supra note 10 at 6-7.
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on the schools and those who support emphasis on the parish. This
polarization is destructive. The parochial schools have served their
exalted purpose and are now a hindrance to Catholicism. 0 0
The other view, expressed by Robert Hutchins, discounts as
"misplaced piety" the attachment given to statements by men, such
as Thomas Jefferson, who did not participate in the adoption of the
first amendment. The future of the western world is as the world's
schoolmaster, and the future of democracy rests in becoming a com-
munity learning together to govern itself and achieving the common
good, not being obstructed by a figure of speech. His principal wish
is for more federal aid to education, which he considers inevitable,
and is based upon the over-riding public purpose, and benefit, of
education. It is self-defeating to try to act as though schools under
religious auspices did not exist. Any aid which might accrue to reli-
gion is incidental to the over-riding benefit, which will not be achieved
unless parochial schools are included. 10'
Hutchins' views were expressed before the Federal Education
Acts of 1963 or 1965, and at least part of his goal was obtained, since
his wish for aid included parochial schools at all educational levels.
However, and whatever may be the merits of the respective posi-
tions, it seems highly unlikely that either will come to pass. On the
one hand, it borders upon the impossible to believe that there will be,
anytime in the foreseeable future, sufficient lay strength within the
Catholic Church to cause it to abandon its school system and join the
ever more secularized public system. On the other hand, while it may
be true that there has been an "advent of actual religious tolerance
in wide areas of the United States" which has "created a receptive
audience for Catholic petitions to share the public fund to which
Catholics as taxpayers must contribute", 02 it is improbable, although
perhaps not impossible, to expect that aid to the extent desired by
Hutchins will either forthcoming from our legislatures or approved
by the Court.
The Extent of Permissible Future Aid
It is most surely a truism to state that the chaotic condition of
legal theory on our question reflects the confused social and political
issues which underlie it.103 It is true, as McLaughlin points out, that
our western allies, most notably Holland, are more accommodating
financially to parochial education than our country.' 0 4 Is it true that
financial aid will grow with the question being "how much" and
"how far" not "if", "when", or "why", because the trend is in motion
110 Deedy, supra note 1, at 17-18.
ol Hutchins, The Future of the Wall, 17-25 in OAKS, supra note 10.
1 Supra note 84 at 926.
103 Supra note 84 at 927.
104 Supra note 89 at 419.
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and, "it would take a High Court of Douglases to reverse the trend
. . . this is a time of Burgers and Blackmuns and Nixonian prefer-
ences and white middle-class ascendancy and these inter-relate and
parochial schools will be the beneficiary."?' 0 5 Our Court today is
composed of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Brennan,
Douglas, Marshall, Powell, Rehnquist, Stewart, and White. The pres-
ent Court has not decided a parochial aid case. Justices Black and
Harlan have died since the last aid case and have been succeeded by
Justices Powell and Rehnquist.
The importance of the membership of the Court should not be
overlooked. We have noted a change between McCollum and Zorach.
Another, and even better illustration, is a comparison between Jones
v. Opelika'0 6 and Murdock v. Pennsylvania.107 Each case involved exac-
tion of a nominal license fee for selling or distributing books, and
each was contested by members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, faith.
The constitutionality of the license fee was upheld in Jones and
stricken in Murdock. Both were 5-to-4 decisions. What happened in
two years, other than the fact that Mr. Justice Byrnes, who voted
with the Jones majority, resigned from the Court, and was succeeded
by Mr. Justice Rutledge (the establishment foe), who voted with
the Murdock majority?
This writer does not subscribe to Mr. Dooley's views that "no
matter whether th' constitution follows th' flag or not, th' supreme
court follows th' illiction returns". 0 8 However, it could be correct
to believe that the appointers do, in fact, follow "th' illiction re-
turns", and it could be suggested that the "natural law" theory is
present in the minds of the Justices, and some of them, without con-
ceding an adoption of the theory, do, in fact, presume a power of the
Court "to periodically expand or contract Constitutional standards
to conform to the Court's conception of what at a particular time
constitutes 'civilized decency' and 'fundamental liberty and jus-
tice' ".109
Gianella I has suggested that with the passage of time, the role
of the state must transcend traditional boundaries. The vernacular
meaning of "separation" must be revised to conform with new real-
ities if the original purposes and expectations are to be realized, and
as the "social, political, and economic millieu evolves, so must the
content given the first amendment". 1 0 Is this concept anything more,
or less, than "natural law"?
205 Deedy, supra note 1 at 15.
106 316 U.S. 584- (1941).
107 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
108 Mr. Dooley on the Court, 1901, B. SCHWARTZ, A BASIC HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT, 132, 135 (1968).
109 Adamson v. California, 532 U.S. 46, 69 (1946) (Black, J., dissenting opinion).
11o Supra note 9 at 1383-84.
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What, then, is the Court likely to decide about such questions as:
Direct State Subsidies
Although Professor Gianella, in a different context, appears to
suggest that certain dicta of prior decisions may be incorporated into
a test of constitutionality,' and even though today's dictum often
becomes tomorrow's rule of law, there is nothing in the decisions, or
dicta, of the majority, or dissenting, opinions of the Court from Cochran
through Lemon to sustain any belief that this Court would consider
such aid constitutionally permissible. The Court in Cochran, Everson,
and Allen, was careful to point out that the aid was to the pupil and not
to the school. We may well be in an era of Nixonian middle-class-
preferences, but such preferences may also include strict construction,
and it is most unlikely that the Court would make such a departure
from the precedent.
Parental Grants
An Ohio statute authorizing direct grants to parents of non-public
school children was involved in Wolman v. Essex. 12 A three judge
court has held that such grants are an unconstitutional violation of
the establishment clause. The district court applied the three tests
prescribed by Lemon to the statute. The first test-a valid secular
purpose-was satisfied.. The second test-principal or primary effect
-was considered as nothing more than the neutrality test of Schempp
and was not fully satisfied. The court judged the question of neutrality
on the size of the class, noting that the Ohio aid went to the parents
of only 131% of the total number of school children, and distinguished
Everson, Allen, and Walz, where the aid went to all parents, the books
went to all students, and the tax exemptions ran to many non-profit
institutions other than schools. The small size, and sectarian nature
of the class affected prompted the court to turn to the third test-
excessive governmental entanglement-and on this final ground rested
a conclusion that the establishment clause was violated." 3
There is little chance that the Court will find any significant
difference in ultimate effect between this type of aid and the imper-
missible aid in Lemon. Whether to the school, or to the parent, subsidy
-even though only $90.00 per year per pupil-will not survive the
present tests and it is not likely that a majority of the Court will
fashion any new test which could accommodate such aid.
State Tax Exemption of Parents
This form of aid will have a better chance of survival, but will
it survive? Can Walz justify such aid? Is there, really, any significant
difference between such aid and the permissible aid in Walz?
III Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: "Part I.
The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 515 (1968).
112 Civil Action No. 71, 396 (S. D. Ohio 1972).
11 Id. at 19-29.
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Professor Kauper has commented on tax exemptions generally,
and two arguments raised in their support: (1) A "quid-pro-quo"
theory that such exemptions relieve non-profit property from burdens
the state would be obliged to assume, or are given to encourage reli-
gion's promotion of morality, good citizenship, law, and order, and
(2) exempting churches from taxation relieves them of all government
functions and thus, then, achieves the full and complete separation
required by the first amendment, and implements the church's free-
dom of worship." 4 However, Kauper disputes such concepts on the
basis that the amount of aid bears no logical relationship to the moral
good or community welfare that churches might promote, nor is there
logic to the argument that churches should not pay their share of
police and fire protection. Any thinking person should admit that tax
exemption imposes a heavier burden, because of it, upon non-members,
and a heavier burden upon smaller denominations than upon large.115
Of course, whatever the merit of Kauper's point of view, it is inapplic-
able since Walz.
Pfeffer was able to find at least historical, and implied constitu-
tional intent, merit to tax exemption on the basis that exemptions are
as old as taxes, dating back to Biblical days and the Pharoahs, and
were also universally accepted in colonial days.116 He also finds a
conflict between the two religion clauses, because taxation might un-
constitutionally abridge religious liberty, whereas exemption would
appear to involve establishment. 117 It was, of course, the "charting
of a course" of reconciliation between this conflict that led to the
decision in Walz.
Prior to Walz, Gianella II explored the constitutionality of gen-
eral exemptions for churches from income and ad valorem taxes.118
He pointed out that the power of the state to apportion the tax burden
among its citizens as it sees fit is almost as broad as the taxing power
itself. While legislators may not fashion fiscal policy with a net effect
of positive religious aid, it need not subject it to the burdens brought
by the fiscal policy of socialization. Thus, for establishment purposes,
the issue is whether the overall purposes, incidence, and structure of
the tax, and its exemptions, require subjection to it by religious inter-
ests lest they gain a positive governmental aid. 119
Alleged tax inequality was unsuccessfully raised in Carmichael v.
Southern Coal 8i Coke Company,120 in which the Court stated:
114 Kauper, The Constitutionality of Tax Exemption for Religious Alivities, 95, 97 in
OAKS, supra note 10.
115 Id. at 98.
116 Supra note 4 at 183.
117 Id. at 98.
118 Supra note 108 at 545-54.
11 Id. at S45-46.
120 301 U.S. 495 (1937).
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It is inherent in the exercise of the power to tax that a
state be free to select the subjects of taxation and to grant
exemptions .... This Court has repeatedly held that inequal-
ities which result from a singling out of one particular class
for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation
.. Like considerations govern exemptions from the operation
of a tax imposed on the members of a class. A legislature is
not bound to tax every member of a class or none. It may make
distinctions of degree having a rational basis. 121
The fact that parents of public school children do not receive an ex-
emption will not be constitutionally dispositive. The answer is a
first amendment test.
Tax exemption (whether from ad valorem, property, income, sales,
or other tax) for parochial parents complies with the rationale of
Walz that it is not a subsidy, but it merely spares the taxpayer the
burden of supporting the state to this extent. It is even one step re-
moved from Walz in that the exemption does not run directly to the
church. There are differences, also. One difference is the total lack
of any historical background upon which the Court can rely to justify
an extension of Walz, with the limited, and not particularly compar-
able, exception of federal income tax exemption for charitable contri-
butions. The lack of historical reference will necessarily make the
legislation suspect. Another difference could be the narrowness of
the class to which the exemption applies which also, as in Wolman,
will make it suspect-although this may be at least partially corrected
by broadening the class to include payments to other charitable, non-
profit institutions.
The Wolman court concluded that the proposed direct parental
grants satisfied a secular purpose. It is at least open to question
whether the Court, in either a parental grant or parental tax exemp-
tion case, will agree. There is no specific precedent, or language, to
fully support such a conclusion where the aid obviously is in a form
of reimbursement for tuition paid to institutions which foster both
secretarian and secular teaching, and there is no qualification to the
state support. However, it is reasonable to conclude that the present
Court will find sufficient support from Lemon to conclude that there
is a secular legislative purpose.
The primary purpose and effect test is not so easily satisfied, even
if the class is broadened, and even though the extent of the aid is
relatively small. Neither the Walz nor Lemon decisions afford any
real basis for a conclusion. Whatever else may be said, both decisions
effectively ignored the question. Whether satisfied or not, it is prob-
ably that the third test-excessive government entanglement-will
decide the issue.
Can this third test be extended as another "tight rope" to suc-
cessfully span the two clauses? Walz had history on its side, it had
121 Id. at 509.
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property tax exemptions for all non-profit, charitable institutions, and
it did not have the specific question-aid for parochial schools, albeit
indirect. This writer discounts the probability that the present Court
will find a corollary with Walz. It is more probable that this Court will
not find any "pupil benefit" theory in such aid, and that it has the
two defects of Lemon. The first-there is, and can be, no effective sur-
veillance of the parochial school programs under such aid. The second,
the devisive political potential of such exemptions. At whatever level
exemption commences, there will, perforce, be increased political
activity for increases. Partisans will seek even larger exemptions.
Opponents will use all practical means to defeat such proposals. To
accept such exemptions as constitutional would ignore the Lemon
warning that it would be "unrealistic to ignore the fact that many
people confronted with issues of this kind will find their votes aligned
with their faith.122 A Court, indeed, would have to "follow th' illiction
returns". Another factor, which must be in the mind of the Court, even
if neither at issue or discussed, is the fact that such exemptions will
run, to escape possible constitutional objection, to all private school
parents. The Court must consider the possible future efforts of parents
who might seek, in any given area, to avoid the effects of the deseg-
regation decisions of the past. If tax-exemption for private and par-
ochial school parents is constitutional, the possibilities of yet another
attempt to evade are enormous.
In conclusion, and for whatever expressed reason, it can be sur-
mised that the present Court will find such exemptions to be an im-
permissible governmental entanglement with religion, and proscribed
by the first amendment.
State Aid to All
It has been reported that Rep. Richard F. Celeste (D-49, Cleve-
land) has submitted legislation to the Ohio General Assembly which
would authorize payment of $100.00 per year to each student in the
state, regardless of the school attended.12 This solution would very
possibly solve all constitutional objections, but it is not likely to sur-
vive the pragmatic fiscal problems faced by state legislatures. From
all sides, the states are besieged with monetary problems. Tax levies
for schools are being defeated in many areas. According to the informa-
tion submitted to the court in Wolman, there were 2,758,241 pupils
attending school in Ohio the 1970-1971 school year.124 This would be
an outlay of $275,824,100.00 per year.
It does not seem possible that the Ohio legislature, faced with the
tax squeeze on the one hand, and religious opposition on the other,
would pass such legislation. A better solution might include a com-
122 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
123 The Sun Herald, May 18, 1972 at 1, col. 4.
124 Supra note 109 at 5.
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plete restructuring of the public school system through the state with
taxes paid directly to the state and elimination of at least the financial
aspects of the various boards of education. This, also, would raise
outcries from all sides and any such legislation, although perhaps the
better ultimate solution to the education problem, is apt to be a long
time coming.
Federal Aid
Article I, Section VIII of the Constitution authorizes Congress to
tax for the general welfare, and on this section hangs a host of legis-
lation. We can grant that education is not mentioned in the Constitu-
ion, but Congress has already entered the field, as has been seen.
Should it dominate? If it is correct to say that
Today, education is perhaps the most important function
of state and local governments . . . It is the very foundation
of good citizenship. 12 5
such statement must equally apply to the federal government, and
on this basis of general welfare can be found constitutional authority
for additional government aid, which can be reconciled with both of
the first amendment clauses, and ultimately lead to a pre-emption by
the federal government of the entire field of education.
Professor Reutter believes that various interpretations of the Court
in related areas give credence to the belief that Congress does have
the power to provide federal aid to education, and it would be pres-
ently difficult to argue that public education is not connected with
the general welfare.12 6
Until Flast v. Cohen127 an action against Acts of Congress could not
be brought by individuals who could assert only payment of taxes as
giving standing to bring suit. With the right to bring suit now vested
in a federal taxpayer, suits have been brought and more will follow.
The United States Court of Appeals has already decided that direct
federal grants for loaning library books and instructional materials
directly to parochial schools 128 rather than directly to the students
presents constitutional questions not resolved by Allen requiring a
decision by a three judge court.'9
If we accept these premises-(l) education is indeed the most
important problem facing our country today, (2) the first amendment
proscriptions will not tolerate additional state aid, (3) the Congress
has the power, under the welfare clause, to aid education, (4) the
Court has, in general, been willing for thirty years to accept the con-
stitutionality of welfare legislation, (5) this Court might be favorably
125 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
120 E. RsuTrER, JR., SCHOOLS AND THE LAW, 5 (1970).
127 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
128 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 821-27, THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCA-
TION ACT OF 1965.
129 Protestants v. U.S., 435 F.2d 627 (1970).
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disposed to consider such legislation signed by a President who has
publicly stated favor for parochial aid-we can come to the conclusion
that this, and this alone, will be the legislation that can "walk the
tightrope" and provide additional aid, in whatever form, and to what-
ever extent, the Congress may choose, so long as the aid is to all educa-
tion, public and private. The Court, in such event, could conclude that
the important public welfare purpose override any minimal aid that
may accrue to religion.
We predict that the Court will sustain the constitutionality of the
1965 Act and that other extensions of the aid will follow with each in
turn being sustained.
The Collision Course
Parochial aid is with us and, perhaps, as Deedy suggests, more
will surely come. But will this serve either the Catholic or public
good, and should the Catholics be, perhaps, the last persons to answer
"Yes"?1 30
Pfeffer, who finds no constitutional authority for the forms of aid
already approved, would surely question not only the permissibility,
but the wisdom, of additional aid. To him, the separation of church
and state and religious freedom has enabled religion in this country
to achieve "a high estate unequalled anywhere else in the world.
History has justified the great experiment and has proved the proposi-
tion on which it was based-that complete separation of church and
state is best for church and best for state, and secures freedom of
both".'8
It is possible to predict that increased aid might, in the final an-
alysis, bring governmental intervention to a point where to para-
phrase Pfeffer, "religion, having looked to and found princes for sal-
vation, lost it there". 132 What will be the answer when an enrolled
atheist challenges the non-objective teaching of religion, prayer, reli-
gious symbols, selection of text material, etc., in parochial schools?
When an admitted atheist is denied admission to a parochial school?
No such case has yet reached our Court, but it will as surely as night
follows day. Or what reaction when a legislature or state board of
education prescribes the method and manner of instruction in the
entire curriculum?
Some of the "free exercise" decisions are illuminating, but more
for what was not decided than for what actually was. As Pfeffer
points out, Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names13' was a
fourteenth amendment case, decided at a time when the Court was
clearly and diligently protecting business and property interests
130 Deedy, .rpra, note 1 at 16.
131 Sutra note 4 at 605.
IS2 Id. at 289-90.
1S3 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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against undue state influence. There was no suit brought by parents
of parochial children. The religious issue was not stressed, the major
issue being the large financial investment and financially profitable
character of operating parochial schools. Additonally, the private mili-
tary academy was also party to the suit.13 4 The Court did uphold the
right of parents to satisfy the state's educational requirements by
sending their children to non-public schools, but it did not say that
the state could not regulate such schools. Such question was not in
issue, and the Court so noted.135
Meyer v. Nebraska"26 reversed a conviction for teaching German to
parochial school children below the eighth grade, contrary to a Neb-
raska statute. The Court decided only that a guise of protecting the
public interest could not be used for legislative action which is arbi-
trary or without some reasonable relation to some purpose within
the competency of the state to effect.137
It is true that certain dictum in Farrington v. Tokushige"ls critic-
ized the fact that the Act passed by the Hawaii legislature gave
affirmative direction concerning the intimate and essential details
of private schools, entrusted their control to public officers, and
denied both owners and patrons reasonable choice and discretion
in respect of teachers, curriculum, and textbooks.3 6 However, this
statute was directed primarily at private Japanese foreign language
schools and almost all the children attending these schools also
attended public or equivalent private schools. The important differ-
ence between Pierce, Meyer, Farrington and our situation is that none
of these schools received any form of state aid.
Even without state or federal aid, Reutter believes that govern-
ment has almost complete power over what must be taught and
what must not be taught, checked only by the individual liberties
protected by a state or federal Constitution, with power to prescribe
all textbooks, control over qualifications and working conditions of
teachers, and control over the method and manner of subject pre-
sentation.14 0
J. Elson noted the trend developing toward more rigid control
and regulation of non-public schools, with the effect these will be-
come more and more like public schools and thereby reduce or
eliminate their usefulness.' 41 However, "neither rights of religion
nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation . . . Its [the state's]
authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his
134 Supra note 4 at 429.
135 Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
136 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
137 Id. at 399-400.
138 273 U.S. 284 (1926).
13D Id. at 298.
140 Supra note 123 at 29-53.
141 J. ELSON, PUBLIC CONTROLS FOR NoN-PuBic SCHOOLS, 112 (1969).
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claim to control the child's course of conduct on religious con-
science".142 Although parochial parents and educators may look to
the courts to check extension of public controls, it is not likely to
find help there. 143
Can parochial education have it both ways? If the state may aid,
may it therefore regulate? 144 Again,
Once these [parochial] schools become federally funded
they become bound by federal standards . . . and accord-
ingly adherence to Engel would require an end to required
religious exercises. 145
It is open to serious question whether the Court could sustain
attacks upon the religious "exercises" present today in parochial
schools under the present level of state and federal aid. However,
the Court could, at this level, conclude from its prior decisions that
the minimal secular aid given cannot operate to destroy the religious
liberty guarantee of the first amendment. By the same token, if
the aid is permitted to grow, and goes beyond pupil benefit and
strictly secular aid, it is difficult to conceive that the Court, without
revising prior cases, could strike down legislation aimed at almost
full control by the state which standardizes and secularizes parochial
education, or strike down a suit by a parent who challenges either
the admission policies of, or religious "exercises" in, the parochial
schools.
Conclusions
In conclusion, a fair reading of the aid and exercise cases to date,
coupled with the fact of the membership of the Court, and the further
fact that the Allen opinion did not muster a majority, leaves one with
the impression that no further state aid will be found acceptable
unless it is specifically and affirmatively tied, and earmarked, to
obviously secular purposes under state control. The only exception
to further aid might come in the form of federal aid which the Court,
without reversing its prior first amendment decisions, may sustain
under the provisions of Article I, Section VIII by adopting natural
law and concluding that the overriding public welfare need requires
such aid in spite of the "minimal" aid that may accrue to religion
as a result.
If, and when, the above happens, and when the concentrated
attacks begin against the conduct of religious "exercises", the churches
may well wonder if it would not have been better "in the interest
of fully preserving their status as free and independent institutions
142 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (bracketed-language added).
243 Supra note at 119-20.
144 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, note 13 at 27 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
145 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, at 693-94 (1971) (Douglas J., dissenting).
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...to shed the cloak of governmental favoritism and stand before the
community on the strength of their own messages and missions,
unfettered by state restrictions and unembarrassed by state aid".146
Additional aid, the political battle lines, and divisiveness presents
the very serious risk that parochial education may, in final result,
find that it has, indeed, won a battle and lost the war.
146 Sura note 111 at 98.
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